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E.O. 12958: DECL: CLOSURE OF ICTY
TAGS: [ICTY](#) [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PHUM](#) [SR](#)
SUBJECT: ICTY ACTION PLAN UPDATE NUMBER 2: AUGUST 11, 2006

Classified By: Ambassador Michael Polt, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

Summary

This cable describes GoS ICTY Action Plan implementation as of August 11, 2006.

¶1. (c) Our second meeting with Action Plan coordinator Rasim Ljajic (and an earlier meeting with operational coordinator Vladimir Vukcevic) revealed modest progress in setting up the infrastructure for the Action Plan, but not a great deal more action. The media side of the plan is still woefully lacking - no one in the government has said anything significant about the need to bring in Mladic since the plan was launched July 17. We will continue to push Ljajic to encourage Kostunica to take a leadership role in the effort, and to push Vukcevic to exercise more of his authorities as operational coordinator. End summary.

Actions

¶2. (c) Ljajic told Emboffs in a weekly meeting August 11 that the GoS had blocked an attempt by Mladic's brother-in-law, (FNU) Jegic, to acquire Serbian citizenship (Jegic lives in Serbia but comes from RS). He said the GoS had shared with ICTY all its case files on the Mladic investigation, including statements by Tomic and others and interrogation transcripts from Djogo and others. He said the GoS had made a decision to "immediately act" on any intel provided by ICTY, to include ICTY officials in the operations, and to film the activities. He said the most recent such raid was "an embarrassment," as MUP (acting on ICTY intel passed on by Bosnian intel, says Ljajic) made a surprise raid on a poor) and very surprised) family of four in an apartment in Novi Beograd. Finally, he said the AP team still intends to bring in Tomic and Krga for questioning) but again, he provided no specifics on when that might be, what form the questioning would take, and whether or not the government would let it be known that they had been called in.

Media Plan

¶3. (c) Ljajic said the current plan is to start "leaking" information to the press, in measured fashion, so that the press can claim the information is a result of their own investigative journalism. The information, he said, will paint a picture o Mladic and his supporters as linked to criminal activities, and try to portray a "marriage" of crminality and false patriotism. He said the aim is

two-fold: first, by releasing info given by those in custody, to intimidate them into giving up more by signaling to them that the State will not protect them; and second, to start to show the public that Mladic supporters aren't true patriots, but criminals out for personal gain. We reminded him of the need to have high-level government leaders - particularly the Prime Minister - start to speak out clearly on the issue. He said the Action Plan team had secured a commitment from Kostunica that the PM would come out with a statement) he wouldn't say when that might be, though.

Other Notes

¶4. (c) We also met with Vukcevic earlier on the 11th, and he gave us a glimpse (but not a copy) of the implementation plan) which included written plans by BIA, VBA, and MUP, along with a complex, multi-colored org chart (showing multiple lines of authority for the operational teams but no horizontal integration). Unfortunately, Vukcevic didn't have anything to say about particular results. He noted the work had just begun, and it was still too soon to expect anything major. He assured us, though, that he has full and direct authority over the teams when needed and he is confident they will carry out his direct orders (e.g., ordering electronic surveillance or the search of a house). On a day-to-day basis, though, he works with the teams through deputy prosecutors (one assigned to each team). He confirmed that there is no/no standing task force where representatives of the three services are collocated.

Comment

¶5. (c) There is still no sign that the government is energized about demystifying Mladic or preparing the public for a decision to arrest him. The decision to act immediately on any ICTY tip shows at least an increased sensitivity to following through on requests from the international community as a way to rebuild trust - even if there continues to be skepticism in the GoS and the broader analytical community about the utility/veracity of the ICTY-derived intel. Vukcevic, for his part, so far seems to be taking more of a hands-off approach to the operational aspects, relying on his deputies to act as "watchdogs" for the three operational services. Given Vukcevic's lack of political backing (his appearance in the SWCI/Kostunica meeting notwithstanding) and the bad relations between him and the intel chiefs, he is highly unlikely ever to exercise the kind of operational and political power needed to fully mobilize Serbia's security apparatus. We will continue to push him to test his authorities and political backing by taking more leadership actions at the operational level.

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